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Abstract—In this paper, we investigate secure transmission
over the large-scale multiple-antenna wiretap channel with finite
alphabet inputs. First, we investigate the case where instanta-
neous channel state information (CSI) of the eavesdropper is
known at the transmitter. We show analytically that a generalized
singular value decomposition (GSVD) based design, which is
optimal for Gaussian inputs, may exhibit a severe performance
loss for finite alphabet inputs in the high signal-to-noise ratio
(SNR) regime. In light of this, we propose a novel Per-Group-
GSVD (PG-GSVD) design which can effectively compensate the
performance loss caused by the GSVD design. More importantly,
the computational complexity of the PG-GSVD design is by
orders of magnitude lower than that of the existing design for
finite alphabet inputs in [1] while the resulting performance loss
is minimal. Then, we extend the PG-GSVD design to the case
where only statistical CSI of the eavesdropper is available at
the transmitter. Numerical results indicate that the proposed
PG-GSVD design can be efficiently implemented in large-scale
multiple-antenna systems and achieves significant performance
gains compared to the GSVD design.
I. INTRODUCTION
Security is a critical issue for future 5G wireless networks.
In today’s systems, the security provisioning relies on bit-level
cryptographic mechanisms and associated processing tech-
niques at various stages of the data protocol stack. However,
these solutions have severe drawbacks and many weaknesses
of standardized protection mechanisms for public wireless
networks are well known; although enhanced ciphering and
authentication protocols exist, they impose severe constraints
and high additional costs for the users of public wireless
networks [2]. Therefore, new security approaches based on
information theoretical considerations have been proposed and
are collectively referred to as physical layer security [1]–[28].
Most existing work on physical layer security assumes that
the input signals are Gaussian distributed. Although the Gaus-
sian codebook has been proved to achieve the secrecy capacity
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of the Gaussian wiretap channel [7], the signals employed in
practical communication systems are non-Gaussian and are
often drawn from discrete constellations [29]–[32]. For the
multiple-input, multiple-output, multiple antenna eavesdropper
(MIMOME) wiretap channel with perfect channel state infor-
mation (CSI) of both the desired user and the eavesdropper
at the transmitter, a generalized singular value decomposition
(GSVD) based precoding design was proposed to decouple
the corresponding wiretap channel into independent parallel
subchannels [26]. Then, the optimal power allocation policy
across these subchannels was obtained by an iterative algo-
rithm. However, the simulation results in [1] revealed that
for finite alphabet inputs, the GSVD design is suboptimal.
In fact, the iterative algorithm in [1] can significantly improve
the secrecy rate by directly optimizing the precoder matrix.
Furthermore, for finite alphabet inputs, both the receiver
and the eavesdropper may accurately decode a transmitted
message if the transmit power is sufficiently high. Therefore,
the optimal precoder may not exploit the maximum available
transmit power to maximize the secrecy rate in the high signal-
to-noise ratio (SNR) regime [1], [26], [27]. Instead, it may
be beneficial for the transmitter to use some of the available
transmit power to inject artificial noise (AN) to interfere the
decoding process of the eavesdropper. It has been shown in
[1], [27] that injection of AN improves the secrecy rate for
scenarios where the transmitter has only statistical CSI of the
eavesdropper. Very recently, for the case when imperfect CSI
of the eavesdropper is available at the transmitter, a secure
transmission scheme was proposed in [28] based on the joint
design of the transmit precoder matrix to improve the achiev-
able rate of the desired user and the AN generation scheme
to degrade the achievable rate of the eavesdropper. However,
the computational complexities of the algorithms in [1] and
[28] scale exponentially with the number of transmit antennas.
Therefore, the algorithms in [1], [28] become intractable even
for a moderate number of transmit antennas (e.g., eight).
In this paper, we investigate the secure transmission design
for the large-scale MIMOME wiretap channel with finite al-
phabet inputs. The contributions of our paper are summarized
as follows:
1) For scenarios where the instantaneous CSI of the eaves-
dropper is available at the transmitter, we derive an upper
bound on the secrecy rate for finite alphabet inputs in the
high SNR regime when the GSVD design is employed.
The derived expression shows that, when Nt > N1, in
the high SNR regime, the GSVD design will result in at
2least (Nt −N1) logM b/s/Hz rate loss compared to the
maximal rate for the MIMOME wiretap channel, where
Nt, N1, andM denote the number of transmit antennas,
the rank of the intended receiver’s channel, and the size
of the input signal constellation set, respectively.
2) To tackle this issue, we propose a novel Per-Group-
GSVD (PG-GSVD) design, which pairs different sub-
channels into different groups based on the GSVD struc-
ture. We prove that the proposed PG-GSVD design can
eliminate the performance loss of the GSVD design with
an order of magnitude lower computational complexity
than the design in [1]. Accordingly, we propose an
iterative algorithm based on the gradient descent method
to optimize the secrecy rate.
3) For the scenarios where only statistical CSI of the
eavesdropper is available at the transmitter, we derive an
achievable ergodic secrecy rate expression by invoking
an upper bound on the average mutual information in
fading multiple-input, multiple-output (MIMO) channels
with finite alphabet inputs. Based on this, we extend the
PG-GSVD design to the case where the transmitter has
only statistical CSI of the eavesdropper.
4) By exploiting the low rank property of the transmit
correlation matrices of massive MIMO channels [22],
[33], [34], we derive a condition that the proposed PG-
GSVD design for statistical CSI of the eavesdropper
should satisfy to achieve the maximal secrecy rate for the
MIMOME wiretap channel with finite alphabet inputs in
the high SNR regime. For the cases where this condition
does not hold, we propose an AN generation scheme that
can further increase the secrecy rate performance.
5) Simulation results illustrate that the proposed designs
are well suited for large-scale MIMO wiretap channels
and achieve substantially higher secrecy rates than the
GSVD design while requiring a much lower computa-
tional complexity than the precoder design in [1].
Notation: Vectors are denoted by lower-case bold-face let-
ters; matrices are denoted by upper-case bold-face letters.
Superscripts (·)T , (·)∗, and (·)H stand for the matrix transpose,
conjugate, and conjugate-transpose operations, respectively.
We use tr(A) and A−1 to denote the trace and the inverse of
matrix A, respectively. ⊥ denotes the orthogonal complement
of a subspace. diag {b} denotes a diagonal matrix with the
elements of vector b on its main diagonal. Diag {B} denotes
a diagonal matrix containing in the main diagonal the diagonal
elements of matrix B. The M ×M identity matrix is denoted
by IM , and the all-zero M ×N matrix and the all-zero N × 1
vector are denoted by 0. The fields of complex numbers and
real numbers are denoted by C and R, respectively. E [·]
denotes statistical expectation. [A]mn denotes the element in
the mth row and nth column of matrix A. [a]m denotes the
mth entry of vector a. We use x ∼ CN (0,RN) to denote
a circularly symmetric complex Gaussian vector x ∈ CN×1
with zero mean and covariance matrix RN . null(A) denotes
the null space of matrix A. ei denotes the unit-vector with a
one as the ith element and zeros for all other elements.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We study the MIMOME wiretap channel with a multiple-
antenna transmitter (Alice), a multiple-antenna intended re-
ceiver (Bob), and a multiple-antenna eavesdropper (Eve),
where the corresponding numbers of antennas are denoted by
Nt, Nr, and Ne, respectively. The signals received at Bob and
Eve are denoted by yb and ye, respectively, and can be written
as
yb = HbaGxa + nb (1)
ye = HeaGxa + ne (2)
where xa = [x1, x2, · · · , xNt ]T ∈ CNt×1 denotes the trans-
mitted signal vector having zero mean and the identity matrix
as covariance matrix, andHba ∈ CNr×Nt andHea ∈ CNe×Nt
denote the channel matrices between Alice and Bob and
between Alice and Eve, respectively. The complex independent
identically distributed (i.i.d.) vectors nb ∼ CN (0, σ2b INr) and
ne ∼ CN (0, σ2eINe) represent the channel noises at Bob and
Eve, respectively. G ∈ CNt×Nt is a linear precoding matrix
that has to be optimized for maximization of the secrecy rate.
The precoding matrix has to satisfy the power constraint
tr
{
E
[
Gxax
H
a G
H
]}
= tr
{
GGH
}
≤ P. (3)
In this paper, we assume that the transmitter has perfect
instantaneous CSI of the intended receiver. For the eaves-
dropper’s CSI available at the transmitter, we consider the
following two cases:
1) The perfect instantaneous CSI of the eavesdropper is
available at the transmitter. When the transmitter has
perfect instantaneous knowledge of the eavesdropper’s
channel, the achievable secrecy rate is given by [7]
Csec = max
tr(GGH)≤P
Rsec(G) (4)
Rsec(G) = I (yb;xa)− I (ye;xa) (5)
where I(y;x) denotes the mutual information between
input x and output y.
2) Only statistical CSI of the eavesdropper is available at
the transmitter. To ensure the consistency of the channel
models for Bob and Eve, we assume that both Hba and
Hea are Kronecker fading MIMO channels, i.e.,
Hba = R˜
1/2
Nb
HcR˜
1/2
Nt
(6)
Hea = R
1/2
Ne
HwR
1/2
Nt
(7)
where Hc ∈ CNr×Nt and Hw ∈ CNe×Nt are com-
plex random matrices with independent random entries,
which are distributed as CN (0, 1). Matrices R˜Nt ∈
C
Nt×Nt and R˜Nb ∈ CNb×Nb denote the transmit and
receive correlation matrices of the intended receiver,
respectively, whereas matrices RNt ∈ CNt×Nt and
RNe ∈ CNe×Ne denote the transmit and receive corre-
lation matrices of the eavesdropper, respectively. When
the transmitter has only statistical CSI of Eve’s channel,
the achievable ergodic secrecy rate is given by [22]
C¯sec = max
tr(GGH)≤P
R¯sec(G) (8)
3R¯sec(G) = I (yb;xa)− E [I (ye;xa)] . (9)
In this paper, we assume that perfect instantaneous CSI of
the intended receiver is available at the transmitter [1], [6],
[7], [9], [10], [21], [26], [27]. This assumption applies for
scenarios where the intended receiver is static or the mobility
of the intended receiver is low. In this case, the coherence
time of the intended receiver’s instantaneous channel is large.
Therefore, the instantaneous CSI can be estimated accurately
at the receiver based on training sequences and then be sent
back to the transmitter through dedicated feedback links.
In time division duplex systems, the instantaneous CSI can
alternatively be obtained by exploiting the reciprocity of uplink
and downlink.
For the eavesdropper, we consider two cases. The first
case is that the eavesdropper is an idle user of the system
and the transmitter intends to send a private message to a
particular user of the system while regarding the other users as
eavesdroppers. In this case, we assume perfect instantaneous
CSI of eavesdropper can be obtained at the transmitter [6],
[7], [9], [10], [21]. The second case is that the eavesdropper is
always passive and does not transmit. In this case, we assume
that only statistical CSI of the eavesdropper is available at the
transmitter [4], [8], [11], [22].
The goal of this paper is to optimize the transmit precoding
matrix G for maximization of the secrecy rate in (5) or (9)
when the transmit symbols xa are drawn from a discrete
constellation set with M equiprobable points such as M -ary
quadrature amplitude modulation (QAM) and Nt is large.
III. LOW COMPLEXITY PRECODER DESIGN WITH
INSTANTANEOUS CSI OF THE EAVESDROPPER
In this section, we first provide some useful definitions
which will be used in the subsequent analysis. Then, we
analyze the rate loss of the GSVD design [26] compared to the
maximal rate for finite alphabet inputs in the high SNR regime.
Finally, we propose a PG-GSVD precoder to compensate this
performance loss with low complexity.
A. Some Useful Definitions
Let us introduce some useful definitions for the subsequent
analysis.
Definition 1: Similar to [7], [26], we define the following
subspaces
Sba = null (Hba)⊥ ∩ null (Hea)
Sbe = null (Hba)⊥ ∩ null (Hea)⊥
Sea = null (Hba) ∩ null (Hea)⊥
Sn = null (Hba) ∩ null (Hea) .
Define k = rank
([
HHba H
H
ea
]H)
and hence dim (Sn) =
Nt− k. In addition, define r = dim (Sba) and s = dim (Sbe).
Therefore, dim (Sea) = k − r − s.
Definition 2: Following [7], we define the GSVD of the pair
(Hba,Hea) as follows:
Hba = Uba Σba
[ k Nt−k
Ω−1 0
]
UHa (10)
Hea = Uea Σea
[ k Nt−k
Ω−1 0
]
UHa (11)
where Ua ∈ CNt×Nt , Uba ∈ CNr×Nr , and Uea ∈ CNe×Ne
are unitary matrices. Ω ∈ Ck×k is a non-singular matrix with
diagonal elements ωi, i = 1, . . . , k. Σba ∈ CNr×k and Σea ∈
CNe×k can be expressed as
Σba =

k−r−s s r
Nr−r−s 0 0 0
s 0 Db 0
r 0 0 Ir
 (12)
Σea =

k−r−s s r
k−r−s Ik−r−s 0 0
s 0 De 0
Ne−k+r 0 0 0
 (13)
where Db = diag ([b1, . . . , bs]) ∈ Rs×s and De =
diag ([e1, . . . , es]) ∈ Rs×s are diagonal matrices with real
valued entries. The diagonal elements of Db and De are
ordered as follows:
0 < b1 ≤ b2 ≤ . . . ≤ bs < 1
1 > e1 ≥ e2 ≥ . . . ≥ es > 0
and
b2p + e
2
p = 1, for p = 1, . . . , s.
B. Performance Loss of the GSVD Design
The precoding matrix for the GSVD design can be ex-
pressed as [26]
G = UaAP
1
2 (14)
where P = diag (p1, . . . , pNt) represents a diagonal power
allocation matrix and A is given by
A =
[ k Nt−k
k Ω 0
Nt−k 0 0
]
. (15)
For the GSVD precoder design in (14), the received signals
yb and ye in (1) and (2) can be re-expressed as
y˜b = Σba
[ k Nt−k
Ik 0
]
P
1
2 xa + n˜b (16)
y˜e = Σea
[ k Nt−k
Ik 0
]
P
1
2 xa + n˜e (17)
where y˜b = U
H
bayb, y˜e = U
H
eaye, n˜b = U
H
banb, and n˜e =
UHeane.
Define N1 = rank (Hba) and N2 = rank (Hea). In the
following theorem, we analyze the performance of the GSVD
design for finite alphabet inputs in the high SNR regime.
Theorem 1: In the high SNR regime (P → ∞), for the
GSVD design in (14), the achievable secrecy rate Rsec,high
for finite alphabet signals is upper bounded by
Rsec,high ≤ N1 log2M b/s/Hz. (18)
Proof: See Appendix A. 
Theorem 1 indicates that the GSVD design may result in a
severe performance loss for finite alphabet inputs in the high
4SNR regime. For example, if Nt > Nr, which is a typical
scenario for large-scale MIMO systems [35], [36], the GSVD
design will cause a rate loss of at least (Nt − Nr) log2M
b/s/Hz compared to the maximal rate in the high SNR regime.
The precoder design in [1] avoids this performance loss by
directly optimizing the precoder matrix G. However, this
results in an intractable implementation complexity for large-
scale MIMO systems. Inspired by the idea of decoupling and
grouping of point-to-point MIMO channels for finite alphabet
inputs [37]–[39], we propose a PG-GSVD precoder design
that prevents the performance loss of the GSVD design while
retaining a low complexity in large-scale MIMOME channels.
C. PG-GSVD Precoder Design
As indicated in [39], in order to decouple the MIMO
channels into Nt parallel subchannels, the MIMO channel
matrix has to be an Nt×Nt matrix. However,Σba and Σea in
(16) and (17) are Nr×Nt and Ne×Nt matrices, respectively.
As a result, we need to add to or remove from y˜b, Σba, y˜e,
and Σea some zeros in (16) and (17). To this end, we define
yˆb =
k−r−s 0r+s ˜˜yHb
Nt−k 0
, (19)
where ˜˜yb ∈ C(r+s)×1 is composed of the last r+s elements of
y˜b. Furthermore, we define ω =
[
ω1, · · · , ωk 0T
]H ∈ CNt×1,
yˆe =
[
y˜He 0
T
]H ∈ CNt×1, nˆb ∼ CN (0, σ2b INt), and nˆe ∼
CN (0, σ2eINt). Define two diagonal matrices
Σˆba =

k−r−s s r Nt−k
k−r−s 0 0 0 0
s 0 Dˆb 0 0
r 0 0 Rr 0
Nt−k 0 0 0 0
 (20)
Σˆea =

k−r−s s Nt−k+r
k−r−s Rk−r−s 0 0
s 0 Dˆe 0
Nt−k+r 0 0 0
 (21)
where the elements of Dˆb, Rr, Rk−r−s, and Dˆe are obtained
from the following two equations[
Σˆba
]
(k−r−s+i)(k−r−s+i)
= [Σba](Nr−r−s+i)(k−r−s+i) /
√
ωi,
i = 1, · · · , s+ r (22)[
Σˆea
]
ii
= [Σea]ii /
√
ωi, i = 1, · · · , k − r. (23)
We divide the transmit signal xa into S streams and let Ns =
Nt/S
1. We define the set {ℓ1, . . . , ℓNt} as a permutation of
{1, . . . , Nt}. Ps ∈ CNs×Ns and Vs ∈ CNs×Ns , s = 1, . . . , S,
denote a diagonal and a unitary matrix, respectively. V ∈
1For convenience, we assume Ns = Nt/S is an integer in this paper. If
Nt/S is not an integer, we can easily obtain an integer Ns by adding zeros
in (20) and (21).
CNt×Nt denotes a unitary matrix. For the proposed PG-GSVD
precoder, we set G as follows
G = UaAP
1
2V. (24)
We set
[P]ℓjℓj = [Ps]ii , (25)
where i = 1, . . . , Ns, s = 1, . . . , S, and j = (s− 1)Ns + i.
Also, we set
[V]ℓiℓj ={
[Vs]mn if i = (s− 1)Ns +m, j = (s− 1)Ns + n
0 otherwise
(26)
where m = 1, . . . , Ns, n = 1, . . . , Ns, s = 1, . . . , S, i =
1, . . . , Nt, and j = 1, . . . , Nt. Finally, we let
[xs]i = [xa]ℓj . (27)
Based on (24)–(27) and a pairing scheme {ℓ1, . . . , ℓNt}, the
equivalent received signals at Bob and Eve can be decoupled
as follows
[yˆb]ℓj =
[
Σˆba
]
ℓjℓj
[xˆ]ℓj + [nˆb]ℓj (28)
[yˆe]ℓj =
[
Σˆea
]
ℓjℓj
[xˆ]ℓj + [nˆe]ℓj (29)
where
[xˆ]ℓj =
[
P
1
2
sVsxs
]
i
(30)
for i = 1, . . . , Ns, s = 1, . . . , S, and j = (s − 1)Ns + i.
From (28) and (29), we observe that the transmit signal has
been divided into S independent groups. In each group, the
equivalent signal dimension is Ns × 1. We further define
[yˆb]ℓj = [yb,s]i and [yˆe]ℓj = [ye,s]i.
Based on (28) and (29), the secrecy rate in (5) can be
expressed as
Rsec(G) =
S∑
s=1
(I (yb,s;xs)− I (ye,s;xs)) . (31)
Algorithm 1: Maximizing Rsec(G) with respect to Ps and
Vs.
1) Initialize Ps and V
(0)
s for s = 1, . . . , S with
tr(APAH) = Nt. Set Niter and ε as the maximum
iteration number and a threshold, respectively.
2) Initialize Rsec(G)
(1) based on (31). Set counter n = 1.
3) Update P
(n)
s for s = 1, . . . , S along the gradient decent
direction ∇PsR(G).
4) Normalize tr
(
P
(n)
s
)
to satisfy tr(APAH) = Nt.
5) UpdateV
(n)
s for s = 1, . . . , S along the gradient descent
direction ∇VsR(G).
6) Compute Rsec(G)
(n+1) based on (31). If
Rsec(G)
(n+1) − Rsec(G)(n) > ε and n ≤ Niter,
set n = n+ 1 and repeat Steps 3–5;
7) Compute P and V based on (25) and (26). Set G =
UaAP
1
2V.
5The gradients of I (yb,s;xs) and I (ye,s;xs) with respect to
Ps and Vs can be found in [40, Eq. (22)], based on which an
iterative algorithm can be derived for maximizing Rsec(G), as
given in Algorithm 1.
Remark 1: For precoder design for the MIMO wiretap chan-
nel with finite alphabet inputs, the computational complexity is
dominated [41] by the computation of the mutual information
in [1, Eq. (12)] and [1, Eq. (13)]. We note that the expectations
over the noise vector in [1, Eq. (12)] and [1, Eq. (13)] can
be evaluated by an accurate approximation as in [41, Prop.
2]. Therefore, the corresponding computational complexities
are negligible. Also, we note that computing the expectation
over xa for the mutual information in [1, Eq. (12)] and
[1, Eq. (13)] and the corresponding mean square
error (MSE) matrix in [1, Eq. (17)] and [1, Eq. (18)]
involves additions over the modulation signal space which
scales exponentially with the number of transmit antennas. The
computational complexities of other operations, such as the
matrix product and the GSVD decomposition, are polynomial
functions of the number of transmit and receive antennas.
Therefore, for ease of analysis, we just consider the compu-
tational complexity of calculating the mutual information and
the MSE matrix for comparing the complexities of Algorithm
1 and the complete-search design in [1]. For large Nt, the
computational complexity of the complete-search design in [1]
is dominated by number of additions needed for calculating
the mutual information and the MSE matrix in [1, Eq. (12)],
[1, Eq. (13)], [1, Eq. (17)], and [1, Eq. (18)]. Accordingly,
the computational complexity of the complete-search design
scales linearly with M2Nt . In contrast, the computational
complexity of calculating the mutual information and the MSE
matrix in Algorithm 1 based on (31) and [40, Eq. (22)]
grows linearly with SM2Ns . As a result, the computational
complexity of Algorithm 1 can be significantly lower than that
of the complete-search design when the number of transmit
antennas is large.
Remark 2: We note that Algorithm 1 never decreases the se-
crecy rate Rsec(G) in any iteration, see Step 6. Also, for finite
alphabet input signals, we know that the secrecy rate Rsec(G)
is upper-bounded. This indicates that Algorithm 1 generates a
non-decreasing sequence which is upper-bounded. Therefore,
Algorithm 1 is convergent. Due to the non-convexity of the
objective function Rsec(G), Algorithm 1 will reach a local
optimal point of the secrecy rate in general. As a result, we
implement Algorithm 1 for several random initializations for
Ps and Vs and choose the result that achieves the highest
secrecy rate as the final design solution [42], [43].
For the PG-GSVD design in (24), we have the following
theorem.
Theorem 2: If the inequality (k−N2)Ns ≥ Nt holds, then
we can always find a permutation {ℓ1, . . . , ℓNt} for the PG-
GSVD design in (24), which achieves Rsec,high = Nt log2M
b/s/Hz in the high SNR regime. Proof: See Appendix B.

The algorithm in [1] is equivalent to setting Ns = Nt
in Algorithm 1. Therefore, as long as k − N2 6= 0, it can
compensate the performance loss of the GSVD design and
achieve the saturation rate Nt log2M b/s/Hz in the high SNR
regime, as shown in [1, Figs. 1, 2]. However, in this case,
the computational complexity of the algorithm in [1] grows
exponentially withNt. This is prohibitive in large-scale MIMO
systems. For typical large-scale MIMO systems, we have
Nt > N2 [35], [36], which implies k −N2 6= 0. As a result,
by properly choosing Ns, we can reach a favorable trade-off
between complexity and secrecy rate performance2.
To better illustrate the GSVD design, the precoder design
in [1], and the PG-GSVD design, we provide the following
example.
Example 1: We consider a MIMOME model with Nt = 4,
Nr = 3, Ne = 2, and Ns = 2. Let xa = [x1, x2, x3, x4]
T .[
Dˆb
]
ii
, [Rr]ii, [Rk−r−s]ii, and
[
Dˆe
]
ii
in (20) and (21) are
denoted as Db,i, Rr,i, Rk−r−s,i, and De,i, respectively. [V]ij
is denoted as vij . Based on (20) and (21), the equivalent
received signals yˆb and yˆe for the GSVD design are given
by
yˆb =

0 0 0 0
0 Db,1 0 0
0 0 Rr,1 0
0 0 0 Rr,2


p1 0 0 0
0 p2 0 0
0 0 p3 0
0 0 0 p4

×

x1
x2
x3
x4
+ n̂b
(32a)
=

0
p2Db,1x2
p3Rr,1x3
p4Rr,2x4
+ n̂b (32b)
yˆe =

Rk−r−s,1 0 0 0
0 De,1 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0


p1 0 0 0
0 p2 0 0
0 0 p3 0
0 0 0 p4

×

x1
x2
x3
x4
+ n̂e
(33a)
=

p1Rk−r−s,1x1
p2De,1x2
0
0
+ n̂e. (33b)
We observe from (32b) and (33b) that the GSVD design de-
couples the original MIMO wiretap channel into four parallel
subchannels. In subchannel 3 and 4, x3 and x4 are received
by Bob but not by Eve, respectively. In subchannel 1, x1 is
received by Eve but not by Bob. In subchannel 2, according to
[26, Eq. (12)], if Db,1 < De,1, we set p2 = 0. As a result, for
the GSVD design, x1 is definitely not received by Bob and
x2 may also not be received by Bob.
2We note that as long as k−N2 6= 0, the proposed PG-GSVD design can
also be applied in cases where the transmitter is equipped with fewer antennas
than the receiver.
6The equivalent received signals yˆb and yˆe for the design in
[1] are given by
yˆb =

0 0 0 0
0 Db,1 0 0
0 0 Rr,1 0
0 0 0 Rr,2


p1 0 0 0
0 p2 0 0
0 0 p3 0
0 0 0 p4

×

v11 v12 v13 v14
v21 v22 v23 v24
v31 v32 v33 v34
v41 v42 v43 v44


x1
x2
x3
x4
+ n̂b
(34a)
=

0
p2Db,1
4∑
i=1
v2ixi
p3Rr,1
4∑
i=1
v3ixi
p4Rr,2
4∑
i=1
v4ixi

+ n̂b (34b)
yˆe =

Rk−r−s,1 0 0 0
0 De,1 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0


p1 0 0 0
0 p2 0 0
0 0 p3 0
0 0 0 p4

×

v11 v12 v13 v14
v21 v22 v23 v24
v31 v32 v33 v34
v41 v42 v43 v44


x1
x2
x3
x4
+ n̂e
(35a)
=

p1Rk−r−s,1
4∑
i=1
v1ixi
p2De,1
4∑
i=1
v2ixi
0
0
+ n̂e (35b)
We observe from (34b) and (35b) that for the design in [1],
by setting p1 = p2 = 0, x1, x2, x3, and x4 are combined and
transmitted along subchannel 3 and subchannel 4, which can
be received by Bob but not by Eve. However, in this case,
we need to calculate the expectation over (x1, x2, x3, x4) for
evaluating the mutual information and the MSE matrix, which
requires 42×4 = 65536 additions for quadrature phase shift
keying (QPSK) inputs.
The equivalent received signals yˆb and yˆe for the PG-GSVD
design are given by
yˆb =

0 0 0 0
0 Db,1 0 0
0 0 Rr,1 0
0 0 0 Rr,2


p1 0 0 0
0 p2 0 0
0 0 p3 0
0 0 0 p4

×

v11 0 0 v14
0 v22 v23 0
0 v32 v33 0
v41 0 0 v44


x1
x2
x3
x4
+ n̂b
(36a)
=

0
p2Db,1 (v22x2 + v23x3)
p3Rr,1 (v32x2 + v33x3)
p4Rr,2 (v41x1 + v44x4)
+ n̂b (36b)
yˆe =

Rk−r−s,1 0 0 0
0 De,1 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0


p1 0 0 0
0 p2 0 0
0 0 p3 0
0 0 0 p4

×

v11 0 0 v14
0 v22 v23 0
0 v32 v33 0
v41 0 0 v44


x1
x2
x3
x4
+ n̂e
(37a)
=

p1Rk−r−s,1 (v11x1 + v14x4)
p2De,1 (v22x2 + v23x3)
0
0
+ n̂e (37b)
We observe from (36b) and (37b) that for the PG-GSVD
design, x1 and x4 are combined and transmitted over sub-
channel 4. For x2, even if Db,1 < De,1, it can be combined
with x3 and transmitted over subchannel 3. For the PG-GSVD
design, by setting p1 = p2 = 0, x1, x2, x3, and x4 can also
be received by Bob but not by Eve. As a result, the PG-
GSVD design compensates the performance loss caused by
the GSVD design. In this case, we only need to calculate
the expectation over (x1, x4) and (x2, x3) for evaluating
the mutual information and the MSE matrix, which requires
2× 42×2 = 512 additions for QPSK inputs.
IV. LOW COMPLEXITY PRECODER DESIGN WITH
STATISTICAL CSI OF EVE
If only statistical CSI of Eve is available at the transmitter,
the PG-GSVD design in Section III-C can not be directly
applied to maximize the ergodic secrecy rate in (9). This is
because in (9), the expectation over all possible realizations
of Eve’s channel is needed. It is impossible to find a single
precoder matrix to decouple all channel realizations simulta-
neously. However, by exploiting the asymptotic approximation
results in [43], we can establish the deterministic equivalent
channel of Eve, based on which the PG-GSVD design in
Section III-C can be applied directly. However, this design has
two major drawbacks. First, the iterative algorithm formulated
based on this equivalent channel requires the calculation of
the corresponding asymptotic parameters in each iteration (see
Step 4 in Algorithm 1 in [43]), which increases the com-
putational burden. More importantly, this equivalent channel
is obtained under the assumption that Nt and Ne approach
infinity simultaneously. However, whether this secrecy rate is
achievable when the antenna dimensions are finite is unknown.
In this section, we first propose a low complexity precoder
design to maximize an achievable secrecy rate with statistical
CSI of Eve. Then, we discuss the role of AN.
A. PG-GSVD Design with Statistical CSI
In this subsection, we derive a lower bound on (9), which
is an achievable secrecy rate that does not depend on the
instantaneous eavesdropper channel but only depends on the
correlation matrices RNe and RNt . Then, we propose a
precoder structure that decomposes these matrices into small
7dimensions, which forms the basis for a low complexity
precoder design.
Let RNt = T
HT. Define the GSVD of the pair (Hba,T)
as follows:
Hba = Uba,erg Σba,erg
[ kerg Nt−kerg
Ω−1erg 0
]
UHa,erg (38)
T = Uea,erg Σea,erg
[ kerg Nt−kerg
Ω−1erg 0
]
UHa,erg (39)
where Uba,erg, Σba,erg, Ua,erg, Uea,erg, Σea,erg, Aerg, Ωerg,
kerg, rerg, and serg are obtained by replacing Hea with T in
Section III-A.
Also, we define
Σˆea,erg =

kerg−rerg−serg serg Nt−kerg+rerg
kerg−rerg−serg Rerg 0 0
serg 0 Dˆe,erg 0
Nt−kerg+rerg 0 0 0

(40)
where the elements of Rerg and Dˆe,erg are obtained from the
following equation:[
Σˆea,erg
]
ii
=
[Σea,erg]ii√
ωi,erg
, i = 1, . . . , kerg − rerg (41)
where ωi,erg is the ith diagonal element ofΩerg. Let xq denote
the qth element of the transmit signal constellation set and
bpq = xp−xq , p = 1, . . . ,MNt , q = 1, . . . ,MNt . We further
define
[
Σˆea,erg
]
ℓjℓj
=
[
Σˆs
]
ii
and [bpq]ℓjℓj = [bs,pq]ii for
i = 1, . . . , Ns, s = 1, . . . , S, and j = (s − 1)Ns + i. Perg ∈
CNt×Nt and Verg ∈ CNt×Nt denote a diagonal and a unitary
matrix, respectively. Replace Ps, Vs, P, and V in (25) and
(26) with Ps,erg ∈ CNs×Ns , Vs,erg ∈ CNs×Ns , Perg, and
Verg, respectively. Then, we have the following theorem.
Theorem 3: By setting Gerg = Ua,ergAergP
1
2
ergVerg, a
lower bound on R¯sec(G) in (9) is given by
R¯sec(G) ≥ R¯sec, l(G) =
S∑
s=1
I (yb,s,erg;xs,erg)−Reve,u,
(42)
where yb,s,erg and xs,erg are obtained by replacing Hea with
T in Section III-C and Reve,u is given by
Reve,u = Nt logM − 1
MNt
S∑
s=1
MNs∑
ps=1
log
MNs∑
qs=1
exp
(
− tr(RNe)
σ2e
×bHs,psqsVHs,ergP
1
2
s,ergΣˆ
2
sP
1
2
s,ergVs,ergbs,psqs
)
. (43)
Proof: See Appendix C. 
In Theorem 3, we use an upper bound on the eavesdropper’s
rate, and consequently, obtain a lower bound on the ergodic
secrecy rate. Therefore, maximizing the lower bound on the
ergodic secrecy rate in (42) will yield a lower bound on the
achievable ergodic secrecy rate, C¯sec, in (8).
Based on [32, Eq. (31)], the gradient of Reve,u with respect
to Ps,erg is given by
∇Ps,ergReve,u =
log e
MNsσ2e
Diag

MNs∑
ps=1
gpsqsL
T
psqs
MNs∑
qs=1
gpsqs
 (44)
where
gpsqs = exp
(
− tr (RNe) tr (LpsqsPs,erg)
σ2e
)
(45)
Lpsqs = Σˆ
2
sVs,ergbs,psqsb
H
s,psqsV
H
s,erg. (46)
The gradient of Reve, u with respect to Vs,erg can be
calculated as
∇Vs,ergReve,u = tr(RNe ) log eMNsσ2e
MNs∑
ps=1
1
MNs∑
qs=1
gpsqs
MNs∑
qs=1
gpsqs
×∇Vs,ergbHs,psqsVHs,ergP
1
2
s,ergΣˆ
2
sP
1
2
s,ergVs,ergbs,psqs
(47a)
=
tr(RNe ) log e
MNsσ2e
×
MNs∑
ps=1
MNs∑
qs=1
gpsqsP
1
2
s,ergΣˆ
2
sP
1
2
s,ergVs,ergbs,psqsb
H
s,psqs
MNs∑
qs=1
gpsqs
.
(47b)
Then, the gradients of Rsec, l(G) with respect to Ps,erg and
Vs,erg are given by
∇Ps,erg R¯sec, l(G)=∇Ps,ergI (yb,s,erg;xs,erg)−∇Ps,ergReve,u
(48)
∇Vs,erg R¯sec, l(G)=∇Vs,ergI (yb,s,erg;xs,erg)−∇Vs,ergReve,u
(49)
where∇Ps,ergI (yb,s,erg;xs,erg) and∇Vs,ergI (yb,s,erg;xs,erg)
are given in [43, Eq. (20)] and [43, Eq. (21)], respectively.
We propose Algorithm 2 to maximize the achievable er-
godic secrecy rate R¯sec, l(G). It is important to note that
the number of additions required for calculating R¯sec, l(G)
in (42), ∇Ps,erg R¯sec, l(G) in (48), and ∇Vs,erg R¯sec, l(G) in
(49) scales linearly with SM2Ns . Therefore, for large Nt,
the computational complexity of Algorithm 2 scales linearly
with SM2Ns . In contrast, the computational complexity of the
secure transmission designs with statistical CSI in [1], [27]
scales linearly with M2Nt .
Define N3 = rank (T). Based on (43), we obtain the
following theorem in the high SNR regime.
Theorem 4: If inequality (kerg −N3)Ns ≥ Nt holds, then
we can always find a permutation {ℓ1, . . . , ℓNt} for the PG-
GSVD design in Theorem 3, which achieves Rsec,l,high =
Nt log2M b/s/Hz in the high SNR regime, i.e., the maximal
secrecy rate is achieved. Proof: The proof follows similar
steps as those in Appendix B if Hea is replaced by T. 
Remark 3: For small dimensional MIMO channels, kerg =
N3 may hold. Thus, it is difficult to find a precoder design
that achieves the maximal asymptotic secrecy rate when only
8Algorithm 2: Maximizing R¯sec, l(G) with respect to Ps,erg
and Vs,erg.
1) Initialize Ps,erg and V
(0)
s,erg for s = 1, . . . , S with
tr(AergPergA
H
erg) = Nt. Set Niter and ε as the maxi-
mum number of iterations and a threshold, respectively.
2) Initialize R¯sec, l(G) based on (42) . Set counter n = 1.
3) UpdateP
(n)
s,erg for s = 1, . . . , S along the gradient decent
direction ∇Ps,erg R¯sec, l(G) based on (48).
4) Normalize P
(n)
s,erg to satisfy tr(AergPergA
H
erg) = Nt.
5) Update V
(n)
s,erg for s = 1, . . . , S along the gradient
descent direction ∇Vs,erg R¯sec, l(G) based on (49).
6) Compute R¯sec, l(G)
(n+1) based on (42). If
R¯sec, l(G)
(n+1) − R¯sec, l(G)(n) > ε and n ≤ Niter, set
n = n+ 1 and repeat Steps 3–5;
7) Compute Perg and Verg based on P
(n)
s,erg and V
(n)
s,erg.
Set Gerg = Ua,ergAergP
1
2
ergVerg.
statistical CSI of Eve is available at the transmitter. In this case,
injection of AN may improve the secrecy rate in the high SNR
regime, as shown in [1], [27]. On the other hand, for large-
scale MIMO channels, it is known that typically Nt > N3
holds [22], [33], [34]. Therefore, we have kerg −N3 6= 0. By
exploiting this property, we can formulate a PG-GSVD design
similar to that in (69) and (70) to achieve the maximal secrecy
rate in the high SNR regime by selecting a proper value for
Ns. In this case, AN generation is not necessary in the high
regime SNR.
B. AN Generation
As explained in Remark 3, for (kerg − N3)Ns < Nt,
AN generation may be beneficial to increase the secrecy
rate when the transmitter has only statistical CSI of Eve’s
channel. In particular, with perfect instantaneous CSI of Bob,
the transmitter may construct the AN along the null space of
Hba as follows [1], [27]:
x =Gerg,axa +
√
PAN
Nt −NrVbu (50)
where Gerg,a ∈ CNt×Nt is the precoder for the useful
signal, Vb ∈ CNt×(Nt−Nr) is the null space of Hba, and
u ∼ CN (0, INt−Nr) is the AN. After obtaining Gerg,a
via Algorithm 2, the AN power PAN can be calculated as
3
PAN = P − tr
{
Gerg,aG
H
erg,a
}
[1], [27].
If Alice transmits AN, Eve’s received signal is impaired by
a zero-mean colored Gaussian noise vector with covariance
matrix PAN/(Nt − Nr)HeaVbVHb HHea + σ2eINe . For large-
scale MIMO channels, as Nt →∞, we have
eHi HeaVbV
H
b H
H
eaej =
eHi R
1
2
Ne
HwR
1
2
Nt
VbV
H
b R
1
2
Nt
HHwR
1
2
Ne
ej
(51a)
3We note that although this power allocation policy and transmitting the
AN in the null space of Hea are not optimal in general, simulations in
[1], [27] show that such a design performs well when the transmitter has
perfect statistical CSI of Eve’s channel. A more general joint design of the
precoder and the AN is provided in [28]. However, such a joint design has
a significantly higher computational complexity when Nt is large. Therefore,
for implementation simplicity, in this paper, we design the precoder and the
AN separately as in [1], [27].
TABLE I: Number of additions required for calculating the
mutual information and the MSE matrix for the system
considered in Figure 1.
4× 3× 2 BPSK QPSK
GSVD 8 16
Algorithm 1 32 512
Algorithm 1 in [1] 256 65536
TABLE II: Number of additions required for calculating the
mutual information and the MSE matrix for the system
considered in Figure 2.
64× 48× 48 BPSK QPSK
GSVD 128 256
Algorithm 1 512 8192
Algorithm 1 in [1] 3.04e+038 1.15e+077
= tr
(
HwR
1
2
Nt
VbV
H
b R
1
2
Nt
HHwR
1
2
Ne
eje
H
i R
1
2
Ne
)
(51b)
Nt→∞→ tr(R 12NtVbVHb R
1
2
Nt
)tr
(
R
1
2
Ne
eje
H
i R
1
2
Ne
)
(51c)
= tr
(
VbV
H
b RNt
)
eHi RNeej (51d)
where (51c) is based on [44, Eq. (102)]. As a result, we obtain
PAN
(Nt −Nr)HeaVbV
H
b H
H
ea + σ
2
eINe
Nt→∞→
PAN
(Nt −Nr) tr
(
VbV
H
b RNt
)
RNe + σ
2
eINe =W. (52)
By whitening the noise with W−1/2 and following similar
steps as in Appendix C, Reve, u in (43) becomes
Reve,u = Nt logM − 1
MNs
S∑
s=1
MNs∑
ps=1
log
MNs∑
qs=1
exp (
−tr(RNeW−1)bHs,psqsVHs,ergP
1
2
s,ergΣˆ
2
sP
1
2
s,ergVs,ergbs,psqs
)
.
(53)
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS
We set σb = σe and define SNR = P/(Nrσ
2
b ). Furthermore,
we use Nt×Nr×Ne to denote the simulated wiretap channel.
A. Scenarios with Instantaneous CSI of the Eavesdropper
In this subsection, the elements of Hba and Hea are gen-
erated independently and randomly. Tables I and II compare
the computational complexities of the different schemes for
the systems considered in Figures 1 and 2, respectively.
Figure 1 plots the secrecy rate for the 4 × 3 × 2 wiretap
channel for different precoder designs and different modula-
tion schemes for Ns = 2. We observe from Figure 1 that
Algorithm 1 achieves a similar performance as the precoder
design in [1] but with orders of magnitude lower computational
complexity as indicated in Table I. Both designs achieve the
maximal rate Nt log2M b/s/Hz in the high SNR regime as
indicated by Theorem 2. In contrast, the GSVD design yields
an obvious rate loss in the high SNR regime. For the channels
of Bob and Eve, we have Db,1 = 0.57 and De,1 = 0.81,
respectively. As explained in Example 1, the GSVD design sets
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Fig. 1: Secrecy rate versus SNR for the 4× 3× 2 wiretap
channel for different precoder designs and different
modulation schemes for Ns = 2.
p1 = p2 = 0 in this case. Therefore, the GSVD design suffers
from a 2 log2M b/s/Hz rate loss in the high SNR regime as
shown in Figure 1.
In Figure 2, we show the secrecy rate for the 64× 48× 48
wiretap channel for different precoder designs and different
modulation schemes for Ns = 2. As indicated in Table II,
the computational complexity of the precoder design in [1]
is prohibitive in this case and no results can be shown. We
observe that the secrecy rate of the GSVD design is lower than
the upper bound given in Theorem 1. This is because for the
GSVD design, as indicated in [26, Eq. (12)], only the non-zero
subchannels of Bob which are stronger than the corresponding
subchannels of Eve can be used for transmission. The bi,
i = 1, . . . , s, in (10) are in ascending order while the ei,
i = 1, . . . , s, in (11) are in descending order. Therefore, a large
proportion of Bob’s non-zero subchannels may be abandoned
by the GSVD design for large-scale MIMO channels. As a
result, Algorithm 1 achieves significantly higher secrecy rates
than the GSVD design.
Figure 3 illustrates the convergence behavior of Algorithm
1 for different wiretap channels and different modulation
schemes for Ns = 2 and SNR = 0 dB. Figure 3 shows the
secrecy rate in each iteration. We observe that in all considered
cases, Algorithm 1 converges within a few iterations.
Figure 4 plots the secrecy rate for Algorithm 1 for the 64×
48×48 wiretap channel for different modulation schemes and
different Ns. For the 64× 48× 48 wiretap channel, k−N2 is
equal to 16. As indicated by Theorem 2, when we set Ns = 4,
Algorithm 1 can achieve the maximal rate Nt log2M b/s/Hz
in the high SNR regime. This is validated in Figure 4.
B. Scenarios with Statistical CSI of the Eavesdropper
In Figure 5, we show the secrecy rate for Algorithm 2 for
the 32 × 32 × 32 wiretap channel for Ns = 2 and different
modulation schemes. We set R˜Nb = INb and RNe = INe .
Also, we generate R˜Nt and RNt based on [45, Eq. (3.14)],
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Fig. 2: Secrecy rate versus SNR for the 64× 48× 48 wiretap
channel for different precoder designs and different
modulation schemes for Ns = 2.
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
Iteration Index
Se
cr
ec
y 
Ra
te
 (b
/s/
Hz
)
 
 
QPSK, 64 × 48 × 48
BPSK, 64 × 48 × 48
QPSK, 32 × 24 × 24
BPSK, 32 × 24 × 24
Fig. 3: Secrecy rate versus iteration index for different
wiretap channels and different modulation schemes for
Algorithm 1, Ns = 2, and SNR = 0 dB.
where the truncated Laplacian distribution is used to model
the channel power angle spectrum [45]. The mean angle of
arrival (AoA) is generated randomly and the AoA interval is
A = [−π/6, π/6]. The angular spread is set to be π/2. We
generate one channel realization for the intended receiver’s
channel based on (6). Then, we evaluate the achievable ergodic
secrecy rate based on (42). We observe that in the low-to-
medium SNR regime, Algorithm 2 achieves nearly the same
secrecy rate for all considered modulations. Furthermore, in
the medium-to-high SNR regime, Algorithm 2 achieves a good
secrecy rate performance for each modulation scheme.
Figure 6 and Figure 7 show the secrecy rate for Algorithm
2 for the 32 × 24 × 24 wiretap channel for different mod-
ulation schemes, Ns = 2, and with/without artificial noise
generation for urban and suburban scenarios, respectively.
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Fig. 4: Secrecy rate for Algorithm 1 versus SNR for the
64× 48× 48 wiretap channel for different modulation
schemes and different Ns.
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Fig. 5: Secrecy rate for Algorithm 2 versus SNR for the
32× 32× 32 wiretap channel for different modulation
schemes and Ns = 2.
For these figures, we adopted the 3GPP SCM [46] for the
urban scenario, half-wavelengh antenna spacing at transmitter
and receiver, respectively, a velocity of 36 km/h, and 6
paths. For the intended receiver’s channel, we generate one
channel realization based on the SCM model and use it in
(9). For the eavesdropper’s channel, we generate L = 1000
channel realizations Hl, l = 1, ..., L, based on the SCM
model. According to the Kronecker fading MIMO channel
model in (7), we can estimate RNt =
1
L
∑L
l=1H
H
l Hl and
RNe =
1
L
∑L
l=1HlH
H
l from these channel realizations. For
the precoder design, we substitute the obtained RNt and RNe
into the achievable ergodic secrecy rate expression in (42).
Figure 6 and Figure 7 indicate that Algorithm 2 achieves
good secrecy rate performance for both urban and suburban
scenarios. Also, AN generation is beneficial and achieves a
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Fig. 6: Secrecy rate for Algorithm 2 versus SNR for the
32× 24× 24 wiretap channel for different modulation
schemes for Ns = 2, and an urban scenario.
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Fig. 7: Secrecy rate for Algorithm 2 versus SNR for the
32× 24× 24 wiretap channel for different modulation
schemes for Ns = 2 and a suburban scenario.
secrecy rate gain in the high SNR regime.
We note that in the low SNR regime, Proposition 2 in
[1] proves that the optimal transmission policy for MIMO
wiretap channels with finite alphabet inputs is beamforming.
Therefore, in the low SNR regime, the optimal performance
of the complete search design in [1] and the proposed low
complexity design should be the same since only one sub-
channel is used for transmission regardless of the value of
Ns. Moreover, it is also proved in [1] that for low SNR the
optimal secrecy rate is independent of the constellation size.
Therefore, as indicated in Figure 5, in the low-to-moderate
SNR regime, the secrecy rates of the proposed low complexity
precoder are virtually the same for QPSK, 8PSK, and 16QAM
modulations. In the high SNR regime, Theorem 3 in this paper
indicates that as long as (k − N2)Ns 6= Nt holds, we can
11
always find a low complexity precoder design to achieve the
saturation secrecy rate regardless of the constellation size. In
the moderate-to-high SNR regime, we expect the performance
gap between the proposed low complexity design and the
complete search design in [1] to increase to some extent with
the constellation size. However, we note that even for the case
of Nt = 4, cf. Table I, it will be difficult to simulate the
complete search design in [1] for 16QAM modulation since
the computational complexity scales linearly with 168 for each
iteration in Algorithm 1 in [1]. However, the proposed low
complexity precoder design can be efficiently implemented
even for the case of Nt = 32 and 16QAM modulation, as
shown in Figure 5.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have investigated the linear precoder design
for large-scale MIMOME wiretap channels with finite alphabet
inputs. For the case where the transmitter has instantaneous
CSI of the eavesdropper, we derived an upper bound on the
secrecy rate for the GSVD design in the high SNR regime. The
derived expression reveals that the GSVD design may lead to
a serious performance loss. Motivated by this, we proposed a
novel PG-GSVD design to overcome the negative properties
of the GSVD design while retaining its low computational
complexity for large-scale MIMO systems. We further ex-
tended the PG-GSVD design to the case where only statistical
CSI of the eavesdropper is available at the transmitter. For
massive MIMO channels with strong transmit correlation, we
proved that the proposed PG-GSVD design with statistical
CSI of the eavesdropper can achieve the maximal secrecy rate
for finite alphabet inputs for the MIMOME wiretap channel
in the high SNR regime. For massive MIMO channels with
weak transmit correlation, we proposed an AN generation
scheme to improve the secrecy rate in the high SNR regime.
Simulation results indicated that the proposed designs perform
well in large-scale MIMOME wiretap channels and achieve
substantial secrecy rate gains compared to the GSVD design
for finite alphabet inputs while requiring a substantially lower
computational complexity compared to the existing precoder
design in [1]. Possible extensions of the proposed designs
include the consideration of imperfect CSI of the intended
user channel, multiuser settings, and the multi-cell scenarios
with pilot contamination.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF THEOREM 1
Based on (10) and (16), I (yb;xa) in (5) for the GSVD
design becomes
I (yb;xa) =
s∑
i=1
I
(
b2ipk−r−s+i
)
+
r∑
i=1
I (pk−s+i) (54)
where I(γ) = I(x;
√
γx + n). Therefore, for P → ∞, we
obtain
lim
P→∞
I (yb;xa) ≤ (s+ r) log2(M). (55)
According to Inclusion–Exclusion Principle [47], we know
dim (Sba) + dim (Sbe) = dim (Sba ∪ Sbe)− dim (Sba ∩ Sbe) .
(56)
For the subspaces Sba and Sbe, we have
Sba ∩ Sbe
=
(
null (Hba)
⊥ ∩ null (Hea)
)
∩
(
null (Hba)
⊥ ∩ null (Hea)⊥
)
(57a)
=
(
null (Hba)
⊥ ∩ null (Hea)
)
∩
(
null (Hea)
⊥ ∩ null (Hba)⊥
)
(57b)
= null (Hba)
⊥∩
(
(null (Hea)) ∩ null (Hea)⊥
)
∩null (Hba)⊥
(57c)
= ∅ (57d)
where (57b) and (57c) are obtained based on the properties of
intersections [48].
Also, we have
Sba ∪ Sbe
=
(
null (Hba)
⊥ ∩ null (Hea)
)
∪
(
null (Hba)
⊥∩null (Hea)⊥
)
(58a)
= null (Hba)
⊥ ∩
(
null (Hea) ∪ null (Hea)⊥
)
(58b)
= null (Hba)
⊥
(58c)
where (58b) and (58c) are obtained based on the Distributive
Law of sets [48] and the Rank–Nullity Theorem [49], respec-
tively.
From (56)–(58), we obtain
s+ r = dim (Sba) + dim (Sbe) = dim
(
null (Hba)
⊥
)
.
(59)
Assuming vi ∈ CNt×1 and uj ∈ CNr×1 are the Nt left and
Nr right singular vectors of Hba, respectively, i = 1, . . . , Nt,
j = 1, . . . , Nr, Hba can be written as
Hba =
N1∑
i=1
λiuiv
H
i (60)
where λi is the singular value of Hea. For N1 < Nt, we have
null (Hba) =
Nt∑
i=N1+1
ωiviv
H
i (61)
where ωi denotes an arbitrary non-zero complex value, i =
1, . . . , Nt. Based on the property of the orthogonal comple-
ment of a subspace [50], we obtain(
null (Hba)
⊥
)
=
(
Nt∑
i=N1+1
ωiviv
H
i
)⊥
(62a)
= null
(
Nt∑
i=N1+1
ωiviv
H
i
)
(62b)
=
N1∑
i=1
ωiviv
H
i . (62c)
Therefore, we have
dim
(
null (Hba)
⊥
)
= N1. (63)
For N1 = Nt, null (Hba) = ∅, and we obtain
dim
(
null (Hba)
⊥
)
= Nt. (64)
Combining (5), (55), (59), (63), and (64) completes the proof.
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APPENDIX B
PROOF OF THEOREM 2
The key idea of achieving the maximal rate Nt logM b/s/Hz
in the high SNR regime is to guarantee that all Nt signals
can be received by Bob but not by Eve. To achieve this, Ns
signals are combined into a group and transmitted along the
subchannels Rr in (20). As a result, we need to analyze the
dimension of Sba.
Based on the Inclusion–Exclusion Principle [47], we have
dim (Sba) + dim (Sn) = dim (Sba ∪ Sn)− dim (Sba ∩ Sn) .
(65)
Following similar steps as in (57) and (58), we obtain
Sba ∩ Sn
=
(
null (Hba)
⊥ ∩ null (Hea)
)
∩ (null (Hba) ∩ null (Hea))
(66a)
=
(
null (Hea) ∩ null (Hba)⊥
)
∩ (null (Hba) ∩ null (Hea))
(66b)
= null (Hea)∩
(
(null (Hba))
⊥ ∩ null (Hba)
)
∩null (Hea)
(66c)
= ∅ (66d)
and
Sba ∪ Sn
=
(
null (Hba)
⊥ ∩ null (Hea)
)
∪ (null (Hba) ∩ null (Hea))
(67a)
= null (Hea) ∩
(
null (Hba)
⊥ ∪ null (Hea)
)
(67b)
= null (Hea) . (67c)
Since rank (Hea) = N2, we have dim (null (Hea)) = Nt −
N2. Then, based on (65), (66d), (67c), we obtain
r +Nt − k = Nt −N2. (68)
From (68), we know r = k −N2.
When (k−N2)Ns ≥ Nt, we design the PG-GSVD precoder
in (24) as follows. We set
P =

k−r−s s r Nt−k
k−r−s 0 0 0 0
s 0 0 0 0
r 0 0 diag (p1, . . . pr) 0
Nt−k 0 0 0 0
. (69)
Also, we select a pairing scheme {ℓ1, . . . , ℓNt} in (25) satis-
fying
[Ps]ii =
{
0 if 1 ≤ i ≤ Ns − 1
pj
ωk−r+j
if i = Ns
(70)
for s = 1, . . . , S, i = 1, . . . , Ns, and j = 1, . . . , r.
Based on the design in (69) and (70), in the high SNR
regime, we have
I (yb,s;xs)
P→∞→ Ns logM (71)
I (ye,s;xs) = 0. (72)
Substituting (71) and (72) into (31) completes the proof.
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF THEOREM 3
By setting Gerg = Ua,ergAergP
1
2
ergVerg, we know
I (yb;xa) in (9) can be written as
I (yb;xa) =
S∑
s=1
I (yb,s,erg;xs,erg) . (73)
Next, we consider E [I (ye;xa)]. In the expression of
I (ye;xa) in [1, Eq. (12)], log exp(
∑
xk) is a convex function.
Therefore, by applying Jensen’s inequality to I (ye;xa), we
obtain an upper bound on E [I (ye;xa)]
E [I (ye;xa)] ≤ Reve,u = Nt logM
− 1
MNt
MNt∑
p=1
log
MNt∑
q=1
exp
(
− tr(RNe)
σ2e
bHpqG
HRNtGbpq
)
(74)
Substituting G =Gerg, RNt = T
HT, and (39) in (74), we
have
Reve,u = Nt logM − 1
MNt
MNt∑
p=1
log
MNt∑
q=1
exp
(
− tr(RNe)
σ2e
bHpqV
H
ergP
1
2
ergΣ˜
2
ea,ergP
1
2
ergVergbpq
)
.
(75)
Considering the structure of Perg andVerg in Section IV-A,
Reve,u can be further simplified as in (76a)–(76f) at the top
of the next page.
Combining (9), (73), (74), and (76f) completes the proof.
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